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FIDUCIARY POWER TO COMPROMISE CLAIMS
THOMAS L. SHAFFER
HE sorry state of fiduciary administrative powers in American
trust law is an old but healing wound. Our English brothers,
who began repair on a similar lesion in the nineteenth century,
are still well ahead of us.' A few state legislatures poured on balm
of varying degrees of efficacy years ago, but they were not many.'
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws seemed to promise
a cure in the early 1930's,3 then abandoned the effort for a genera-
tion.4 They have lately returned to their patient, and the Uniform
Trustees' Powers Act shows promise of increasing adoption. The
incorporation-by-reference treatment is now in use in three
states;5 and a number of other jurisdictions-most notably that
great aggravator of trust diseases, New York--are showing
tardy concern with remedies.
It may be timely to assess the effect of statutory cure on the
centuries of case-made powers rules and the double handful of
antiquated statutes to which the cure will be added. I have
chosen to do that within the narrow context of one prosaic ex-
ample of fiduciary activity-the power to compromise claims.
But some of what is developed here-most importantly the effect
of the new statutes on the existing case law of administrative
discretion-may deserve broader focus.
I
INTRODUCTION
A fiduciary has a duty to prosecute claims to collection, and
to defend the fiduciary estate from claims against it.8 Because a
Thomas L. Shaffer is Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. See Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, § 11;
Settled Land Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 18, § 64; Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16
Geo. 5, c. 19; Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53; Fratcher, Fiduciary
Administration in England, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 12, 26-36 (1965).
2. Statutes in Florida, Illinois, Oklahoma, and Texas are examples and are
discussed at pp. 541-42 infra.
3. See the first tentative draft of the Uniform Trust Administration Act, in
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1932 Handbook
244-48.
4. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1933
Handbook 80, 312-36. The powers reform was revived in 1961 with the appoint-
ment of a committee to draft a Uniform Trustees' Powers Act. The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1961 Handbook 14. See also
1962 Handbook 14; 1963 Handbook 14, 72; 1964 Handbook 15, 92, 96, 133, 265-72.
The last reference contains the text of the act with a prefatory note.
5. Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee, whose statutes are discussed in
text accompanying notes 110-18 infra. See Trautman, Decedents' Estates, Trusts
and Future Interests, 17 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 1031-33 (1964).
6. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 127 (Supp. 1965). See New York Temporary
Comm'n'on Estates, Third Report 18, 350 (1964).
7. Restatement (Second), Trusts § 177 (1959).
8. Id. § 178.
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fiduciary's powers "are at least as extensive as his duties,"' he
also has a power to prosecute claims held by the estate and to
defend the estate from claims asserted against it.10 Duties to
prosecute and defend suggest duties to compromise claims, or
to submit them to binding arbitration, or to abandon them, and
it is not too much to suppose-as the Restatement (Second),
Trusts does-that they imply powers to compromise, arbitrate,
and abandon.11 The inquiring purpose here is to look at the ex-
tent to which that reasoning is borne out in cases and statutes,
and at the limits of fiduciary discretion applicable to the exercise
of that power, if there is a power.
The history of the power to compromise claims centers on a
stubborn eighteenth century farmer. James Blue left part of his
estate in trust; income was to be paid to his widow for life, re-
mainder to his children. The administrators of his estate were his
daughter, Ann Marshall, and her husband. Marshall was judicially
ordered to sell a leasehold Blue had held as lessor and to pay the
proceeds of sale to the testamentary trustees. The real estate in-
volved was occupied by an adamant tenant who was in arrears
on his rent, as he had been for years, and who compounded his
neglect by refusing to leave when asked. Marshall, like Elwood
P. Dowd,' elected to be pleasant rather than smart and offered
the tenant twenty pounds to leave. The tenant refused to leave
unless the offer included Marshall's waiver of all back rent,
which covered a period before Blue's death, as well as an of
Marshall's tenure, and which amounted to 225 pounds. Marshall
agreed, and waived, and paid, and the tenant left.
Marshall's mother-in-law then demanded that Marshall pay
over the proceeds of sale of the leasehold to the testamentary
trustees. Marshall answered that the costs of his gentle eviction
had exhausted the proceeds. When the insensitive mother-in-law
sued to surcharge Marshall for the waived rent, and to deny him
allowance for his out-of-pocket bribery, the Lord Chancellor
(Talbot) vindicated Marshall. 3 In the first place, he said, equity
was not so mechanical that it could hold Marshall for every asset
in his hands at its paper value. Whatever his inventory said or
might have said, the fact was that Marshall never received any
rents. Since the estate received no rents, and since the rents owed
9. Id. § 186, comment e.
,10. Id. § 192, comment a.
11. Id. § 192.
12. 'Dr. Chumley," replies Elwood, "my mother used to say to me, 'In this
world, Elwood, you must be oh, oh, so smart or oh, so pleasant. For years
I was smart. I recommend pleasant. You may quote me."
Chase, Harvey, in The Best Plays of 1944-45, 176, 187 (Mantle ed. 194S).
13. Blue v. Marshall, 3 Peere Wins. 381, 24 Eng. Rep. 1110 (Ch. 173S).
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were not collectible, the estate could hardly have suffered by their
release.
In the second place, Lord Talbot said, Marshall had acted
prudently. There are times-and this was one-when waiver and
even bribery are a small price to pay for a little peace.
A vexatious tenant may put his landlord to great trouble and delay
by a wrongful detainer of the possession, and by damaging the
estate in the mean time; and may force the landlord to eject-
ments, writs of error, and bills in equity, by means of which he
may lose not only his accruing rent, but his costs of suit .... 14
All this was in 1723. Prior to that, it had not been denied
that a fiduciary could release claims and even compound them,
but there were dicta in a couple of early cases' that suggested he
remained accountable for receivables whether he received them
or not. "For the law presumeth that he hath so much as he doth
release .... ,'l There was also some inconclusive authority to
the contrary. 17 Blue v. Marshall, therefore, settled a doubtful
question, at least in equity.
In the Exchequer, more than a century later, the law courts
were invited to recognize the principle. The decedent there had
set out for America from Lincolnshire with between 700 and 800
pounds in his pocket. When he reached Liverpool, where he found
no ship for America, he arranged to wait in the house of a pilot
named Jones. Shortly after he moved in with Jones, he died. Jones
appropriated the contents of his pocket, and spent it before any-
one discovered what he had done.
Healey, the administrator, entered on his office with a
knowledge of what was in his decedent's pocket; he sued Jones,
recovered judgement for 750 pounds, then sued out mesne process
and had Jones imprisoned on the debt. Healey was then ap-
proached by friends of Jones, who suggested they could raise
150 pounds if Healey would take that and let Jones out of prison;
Healey accepted the offer. The next of kin then sued to surcharge
Jones, arguing that, at law, he had to account for the full amount
of the indebtedness.
Healey's counsel suggested that the only question was
"whether the defendant has acted fairly, honestly, and bona fide."
14. Id. at 382-83, 24 Eng. Rep. at 1111.
15. Brightman v. Keighley, Cro. Eliz. 43, 78 Eng. Rep. 307 (K.B. 1585-86);
Russel's Case, 5 Coke 27a, 77 Eng. Rep. 91 (K.B. 1584).
16. Brightman v. Keighley, supra note 15.
17. Kniveton v. Latham, Cro. Car. 490, 79 Eng. Rep. 1023 (K.B. 1638);
Russel's Case, 5 Coke 27a, 77 Eng. Rep. 91 (K.B. 1584). Equity relieved against
surcharge for a substitution of debts in Armitage v. Metcalf, 1 Ch. Cas. 74, 22 Eng.
Rep. 701 (Ch. 1666).
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Counsel for the next of kin denied that that was the question and
stated that the only issue was whether the debt was an estate
asset. Baron Bayley asked the latter lawyer: "Is there any case
where it has been held, that where an executor arrests a debtor,
and gets all he can from him, or is likely to get, he makes himself
personally liable?"' 8 That biased question got no answer, and
Baron Bayley held for Healey.
"The administrator," he said, "has here adopted the course
most likely to obtain payment of the debt by pressure and suing
the debtor; and I should say that it would be monstrous, if the
law were as contended for on behalf of the plaintiff." If strict
accounting for paper assets was necessary, every indebtedness
had to be accounted for, he said, and a fiduciary would be bound
"either [to] keep the debtor in gaol all his life, or be liable to any
creditor to the amount of the debt .... " Baron Bayley said he
found no authority in England "which supports so monstrous a
proposition." And, he added, "I should be sorry if I had." 10
The test set down in Pennington v. Healey was whether the
fiduciary exercised "a reasonable and honest discretion in making
the compromise." If so, the court held, he is protected in making
his compromise, and his account is entitled to reflect it, whether
the proceeding is legal or equitable. "The general rule of law is,
that the executor is accountable for all which he has received, or
which, in the honest discharge of his duty, he could or might ob-
tain. 2 0 With some express reservation applicable to trusts for the
benefit of creditors,-2 this was, by 1860, the law as to trustees,
who, in that year, were also held able to abandon claims.22
American authorities on the question recognized the principle
of Blue v. Marsall2 3 and even extended it to cases of submission
of claims to arbitration," but the question over here was soon
involved in early statutes providing for judicial approval of
fiduciary compromises. - 5
18. Pennington v. Healey, 2 LJ. Ex. 98, 99, 149 Eng. Rep. 4SS, 457 (Ex. 1833).
19. Id. at 100, 149 Eng. Rep. at 457-58.
20. Ibid. See Matter of Loper, 2 Red. 545 (N.Y. Surr. CL. 1877).
21. Shephard v. Adlington, Turn. & R. 379, 37 Eng. Rep. 1147 (Ch. 1823).
22. Hobday v. Peters, 28 Beav. 603, 54 Eng. Rep. 498 (Ch. 1860). But sce
Kingdon v. Castleman, 46 L.. Ch. 448 (Ch. 1877).
23. Murray v. Blatchford, 1 Wend. 583 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1828); Chouteau v.
Suydam, 21 N.Y. 179 (1860); In re Scott, .1 Red. 234 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1847)
(rejecting any distinction between the rule on the point in law and the rule in
equity).
24. Powers to submit to arbitration were recognized as inherent in personal
representatives in Bean v. Farnam, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 269 (1828), and Wood v.
Tunnicliff, 74 N.Y. 38 (1878). See Chadbour v. Chadbourn, 91 Mass. (9 Allen)
173 (1864). Section 192 of the Restatement of Trusts recognizes this power as on
the same footing as powers to compromise or abandon.
25. Matter of Parker, 1 Barb. Ch. 154 (N.Y. 1845); Chouteau v. Suydam,
21 N.Y. 179 (1860).
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The following discussion will explore, first, the sources of
fiduciary power to compromise and the effect of statutory powers
on the propriety and validity of what fiduciaries do in compromis-
ing claims. It will, second, look at the power to compromise as
illustrative of a broader problem which new powers legislation
raises on the exercise of administrative discretion.
II
SOURCES OF THE POWER To COMPROMISE
A. Inherent and Implied
There is an analytical distinction between fiduciary powers
that are inherent and those that are implied, but it seems to make
little difference in the cases involving fiduciary powers to com-
promise. The cases generally hold that fiduciaries have power to
compromise and that they need neither express language nor
statutory statement of the power. This is true of all jurisdictions
except those that have construed their statutes on judicial ap-
proval of compromises to take away the power 2 ---and even those
jurisdictions admit by implication that, at common law, a fiduci-
ary had power to compromise.
1. Personal Representatives
Executors and administrators are generally held to have an
inherent power to compromise,27 which extends to abandonment 8
and to submission of claims to arbitration.2 These powers are
necessary corollaries of the powers (duties) to defend and prose-
cute;a° the opinions affirming them trace, usually, to the English
26. These are discussed at pp. 542-45 infra.
27. Arledge v. Ellison, 247 Ala. '190, 23 So. 2d 389 (1945) ; Lynn v. McDaniel,
210 Ala. 474, 98 So. 287 (1923); Carr v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 180 Ala. 159, 60 So.
277 (1912); Wunderlich v. Bowen, 193 Ark. 284, 100 S.W.2d 80 (1936); In re
Richards' Estate, 103 P.2d 1033 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1940), afi'd, 17 Cal. 2d 259,
109 P.2d 923 (1941); Wallin v. Smolensky, 303 Mass. 39, 20 N.E.2d 406 (1939);
Jones v. Jones, 297 Mass. 198, 7 N.E.2d 1015 (1937); Cook v. Richardson, 178
Mass. 125, 59 N.E. 675 (1901); Matter of Estate of Corbin, 227 App. Div. 87,
236 N.Y. Supp. 653 (1st Dep't 1929). See also MacDonald v. Gough, 327 Mass.
739, 101 N.E.2d 124 (1951). But see older California authority to the contrary.
Siddall v. Clark, 89 Cal. 321, 26 Pac. 829 (1891); See v. Joughin, 18 Cal. App. 2d
414, 64 P.2d 149 (Dist. Ct. App. 1937); Taylor v. Sanson, 24 Cal. App. 515, 141
Pac. 1060 (Dist. Ct. App. 1914).
28. See, e.g., the line of Pennsylvania cases. Hartje's Estate, 320 Pa. 76, 181
AUt. 497 (1935) (involving a trustee); Coates's Estate, 273 Pa. 201, 116 At. 821
(1922); Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 203
Pa. 82, 52 Adt. 34 (1902); Reynolds v. Cridge, 131 Pa. 189, 18 Atl. '1010 (1890).
29. Chadbourn v. Chadbourn, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 173 (1864), and cases cited
in note 24 supra.
30. Carr v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 180 Ala. 159, 165, 60 So. 277, 279 (1912):
An administrator has the full, legal title to all choses of action due the
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authorities. The questions raised under a personal representative's
power to compromise go, not to the existence of the power, but
to such things as the possibility of surcharge for improper exer-
cise of the power; the validity of the settlement transaction in
the face of fiduciary imprudence; and the amount of discretion
the fiduciary has in refusing or insisting upon compromises con-
trary to the beneficiary's wishes or the probate judge's view of
allowable discretion. All of these issues are discussed below.
2. Trustees
The folklore of analytical trust scholarship has it that trust-
ees have no inherent administrative powers.3 This has very little
support in cases on trustee powers to compromise claims,"' but,
the pressures of traditional analysis being what they are, it may
be useful to treat the sources of trustee power to compromise in
terms of (1) those cases that treat the power as inherent, and
(2) those that treat it as implied from the provisions of the in-
strument or from the specific trust relationship.
Inkerent.-There is a good deal of warrant for saying that
trustees have an inherent power to compromise claims-and, in-
deed, the purport of the Restatement (Second), Trusts on com-
promise33 seems inconsistent with the purport of the same au-
thority on powers generally. While Professor Scott seems gen-
erally to support the view that trustees are without inherent pow-
ers, 5 his brief discussion of powers to compromise is consistent
with the view that they are inherent," that "trustees" have cer-
tain duties "'incident to the office of trustee .... ' Among such
general duties is the power to compromise doubtful claims for or
against the trust estate." If this sort of power is to be consid-
ered implied, it is an inference taken from the fact of legal tile,
estate ... and he may, in the absence of fraud or collusion, release,
compromise or discharge them as fully as if he were the absolute owner....
Underwood v. Sample, 70 Ind. 446 (1880); Gill v. Anglo-American Ass'n, 21 Ky.
L. Rep. 690, 52 S.W. 929 (1899); fanns v. A.E. Sanford Co., 82 N.J.L. 124, 81
AtL. 491 (Sup. Ct. 1911); Denney v. Parker, 10 Wash. 218, 38 Pac. 1018 (1894).
Cf. Harwood-Yancey Co. v. Lawrenceburg Warehouse Co., 167 Tenn. 14, 65 S.W.2d
192, cert. denied, 292 U. 645 (1933).
31. 2 Scott, Trusts § 186 (2d ed. 1956). See Restatement (Second), Trusts
§ 186 (1959). Cf. Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 627
(1962).
32. Possibly because it is the sort of power that is readily implied from the
purpose of the trust, and therefore falls within what Professor Scott considers
implied powers.
33. Restatement (Second), Trusts § 192 (1959).
34. Id. § 186, comment d.
35. See Scott, Trusts § 186 (2d ed. 1956).
36. Id. § 192, at 1454.
37. Butler v. Butler, 180 Afinn. 134, 144, 230 N.W. 575, 579 (1930).
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not an implication contained either in express powers or direc-
tions on other matters, or in express statutory powers. 8 It is,
in other words, not implied at all, but inherent. This was held
to be true of trustees to collect rents in a village devoted to the
ideals of Henry George; 39 it was the case also in Missouri, where,
by statute, personal representatives cannot compromise without
court approval;4" it is true of personal representatives who act
as statutory trustees in wrongful death actions; 4 and of trustees
in more orthodox circumstances. 2 But there is some authority
to the effect that compromises cannot be made without court ap-
proval, which would suggest a requirement of judicial augmenta-
tion of power,43 and there is at least some conjecture to the effect
that a dry trustee has no power to compromise claims.4 This
last contains dicta and treatise citations for the proposition that
trustees of active trusts lack inherent power.
A few cases extend the inherent power to compromise to
cases of abandonment of trust assets. In Hobday v. Peters,4 for
instance, a trustee whose asset was a policy of life insurance was
held to have the power to abandon it when the settlor ceased
making payment of premiums. A more recent Pennsylvania case 4'
supports the same conclusion, on similar facts, and appears to be
consistent with other authority in that state.4 These cases are
significant where the fidudiary has realized nothing on a claim
he holds. Beyond that the distinction between abandonment and
compromise seems fairly semantic. Every compromise involves
abandonment. A compromised claim is one not worth the time and
38. See, e.g., Maynard v. Cleveland, 76 Ga. 52, 74 (1885): "Here, because
the trustee had the legal title to the note, his right or authority to receive payment
that way was sufficient to protect the debtor ......
39. See Broeker v. Ware, 27 Del. Ch. 8, 29 A.2d 591 (Ch. 1942).
40. See Selleck v. Hawley, 331 Mo. 1038, 56 S.W.2d 387 (1932). For a
discussion of the Missouri statute on personal representatives, see text accompanying
notes 132-37 infra.
41. Maims v. A.E. Sanford Co., 82 NJ.L. 124, 81 At. 491 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
42. Second Nat'l Bank v. Woodworth, 66 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1933) (applying
Michigan law); Kinion v. Riley, 310 Mass. 338, 37 N.E.2d 984 (1941); Suffolk
County Nat'l Bank v. Licht, 256 App. Div. 1080, 11 N.Y.S.2d 124 (2d Dep't 1939).
See also Burgess v. Nail, 103 F.2d 37 (10th Cir. 1939); Ingalls Iron Works Co. v.
Ingalls, 177 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ala. 1959), aff'd, 280 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1960);
Brackett v. Middlesex Banking Co., 89 Conn. 645, 95 Atl. 12 (1915); Rahe v.
Jobusch, 197 I1. App. 200 (1915); Matter of Estate of Ives, 248 N.C. 176, 102
S.E.2d 807 (1958); McGill v. Bison Fast Freight, Inc., 245 N.C. 469, 96 S.E.2d 438
(1957).
43. Morris v. Boyd, 110 Ark. 468, 162 S.W. 69 (1913) (dicta).
44. Belcher v. Cobb, 169 N.C. 689, 86 S.E. 600 (1915). See Spencer v. Harris,
70 Wyo. 505, 252 P.2d 115 (1953).
45. 28 Beav. 603, 54 Eng. Rep. 498 (Ch. 1860).
46. Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Fidelity Ins. Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 203
Pa. 82, 52 AtI. 34 (1902).
47. See note 28 supra.
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expense of collection, and a claim abandoned totally is one not
worth even the time and expense of compromise. The same prin-
ciples should govern the existence and exercise of fiduciary power
in both situations-and, apparently, they do.48
Implied.-Where the trustee has express power to invest
trust assets, or to grant loans, or to borrow funds, it is not re-
markable that courts imply a power to compromise claims. The
Alabama court, for instance, once implied such a power from
the fact that the trustee was vested with legal title. Executors
and administrators acting as statutory trustees under wrongful
death legislation are generally held to have power to settle their
statutory claims, either by analogy to the powers they have to
settle claims involving estate assets,10 or because the legislation
creating their status as plaintiffs is held to imply power to settle
the suits.5
Authorities affirming powers to compromise in personal rep-
resentatives are more numerous than those on trustees,12 and
most statutes also provide statutory apparatus for handling per-
sonal representative compromises. 3 These circumstances lead to
a preference for personal representative status in those rare cases
where it is up to courts to decide whether the fiduciary was act-
ing as a personal representative or a testamentary trustee. Rake
v. Jobusch54 is such a case and involved, as they often do, a
fiduciary who was bonded as personal representative, but not as
testamentary trustee. The court thought that compromise was
more properly a function of the personal representative because
the statutory provision for compromise by personal representa-
tives included procedural apparatus for probate court approval
of the compromise. The statutory procedure, the court said,
"would be of much advantage to an estate and the courts are
inclined to adopt that rule which would be most advantageous
48. Restatement (Second), Trusts § 192 (1959); Uniform Trustees' Powers
Act § 3(c) (19), in The National Conference of Commisioners on Uniform State
Laws, 1964 Handbook 269. Neither the new New York statute nor the Uniform
Trust Administration Act specifically mentions the power to abandon claims, but
the breadth of the statutory powers to compromise doubtless covers abandonment.
See notes 4, 6 supra.
49. Carr v. Illinois Cent_ R.R., 180 Ala. 159, 165, 60 So. 277, 279 (1912).
See Maynard v. Cleveland, 76 Ga. 52 (1885).
50. Pittsburgh C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Gipe, 160 Ind. 360, 65 N.E. 1034 (193);
Manns v. A.. Sanford Co., 82 N.J.L. 124,81 AUt. 491 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
51 Williams v. Louisville & N.R.R., 246 F. Supp. 758, 760 (E.D. Tenn. 1965):
"The personal representative acts ... by virtue of the federal statutory designation
as trustee for the surviving beneficiaries."
52. Compare Annot., 72 A.L.R.2d 191, 200-02 (1958), with Annot, 35
A.L.R.2d 967, 970 (1953).
53. These statutes are discussed at pp. 537-40 infra.
54. 197 Ill. App. 200 (1915).
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in the settlement of estates." 5 The inference is possible that pow-
ers to compromise are more readily found to inhere, and even
more readily implied, in personal representatives than in trustees.
3. Guardians
The generally accurate observation that a guardian's fidu-
ciary powers are more limited than the fiduciary powers of per-
sonal representatives and trustees"6 seems not to obtain with
respect to powers to compromise claims. In Stevens v. Meserve,"
for instance, a guardian took mortgages on real estate in settle-
ment of a claim he held in behalf of his ward. The ward attacked
the transaction as an improper investment (which it apparently
was); the guardian defended on the ground that it was not an
investment, but the compromise of a claim. His distinction was
sustained, the New Hampshire court noting that "it would be
a novel and unreasonable rule of law that would not allow a
guardian to save for his ward all that could be saved ....",I
The power to compromise was considered inherent, as corollary
to the guardian's duty "to use reasonable care and diligence
... M9 Other cases on guardians are not numerous, but tend to
recognize the power to compromise claims as inherent." Guardi-
ans, of course, may be subject to statutory provisions on judicial
approval of compromises and, when they are, are treated the
same way personal representatives are under similar statutes."'
There is also some authority for implying a power to compromise
in guardians from express powers to sue and defend."
B. Express Statutory Power To Compromise
Virtually every jurisdiction has a statute granting power
to compromise claims to fiduciaries, or granting power to local
courts to direct fiduciaries to compromise. The broadest division
of these statutes seems to be into two classes: (1) Older, single-
purpose statutes which grant fiduciary power, or confer jurisdic-
55. Id. at 206.
56. See, e.g., Fratcher, Powers and Duties of Guardians of Property, 45
Iowa L. Rev. 264 (1960); Note, 45 Iowa L. Rev. 360 (1960).
57. 73 N.H. 293, 61 Adt. 420 (1905).
58. Id. at 304, 61 Ati. at 425.
59. Id. at 304, 61 Atl. at 426.
60. Griffin v. Sturges, 131 Conn. 471, 40 A.2d 758 (1944); Maynard v.
Cleveland, 76 Ga. 52 (1885). Cf. Hutchins v. Johnson, 12 Conn. 376 (1837).
61. See, e.g., Moss v. Moose, 184 Ark. 798, 44 SAV.2d 825 (1931); Campbell
v. Atlanta Coach Co., 58 Ga. App. 824, 200 S.E. 203 (1938). Compare the personal
representative cases discussed at pp. 54249 infra.
62. Johnson's Appeal, 71 Conn. 590, 42 At]. 662 (1899). See Union & New
Haven Trust Co. v. Sherwood, 110 Conn. 150, 147 Atl. 562 (1929). Cf. Hutchins
v. Johnson, 12 Conn. 376 (1837).
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tion, narrowly; these are often tied to procedural provisions for
obtaining judicial approval of compromises and are not typically
related to other statutes on fiduciary powers. (2) Broad, dfiodern
statutes on fiduciary powers, which include power to compromise
claims, to abandon them, and to submit disputes to binding arbi-
tration, usually without special provision for judicial approval of
compromises. The statutory structure in Alabama is a fair illus-
tration of the first category; the new New York Fiduciaries'
Powers Act is a fair illustration of the second.
1. Single-Purpose Statutes
Most states have statutes of the single-purpose variety.
These are usually directed only to the compromise of claims;
they are not part of broader powers statutes. They are typically
confined to claims on behalf of the estate, although many extend
to claims against the estate. They are often exercisable-at least
in terms-only after the compromise is judicially approved.
There are two models of the single-purpose statute in existence;
one confers power on fiduciaries, the other confers jurisdiction
on courts to grant power to fiduciaries. Alabama has both models.
Its fiduciary power statute, which is quite typical of the species,
provides:
Whenever a debtor of the decedent is unable to pay all his
debts, the executor or administrator, with the approbation of the
court or judge thereof, may compound with him and give him a
discharge, upon receiving a fair and just dividend of his effects.
A compromise may also be authorized when it appears to be just,
and for the best interest of the estate. 3
Another Alabama statute is typical of the court power
species:
The probate court having jurisdiction of the estate may au-
thorize any executor or administrator to compromise or sell any
bad or doubtful claim due the estate .... o
Except for the last sentence in the Alabama fiduciary power
statute, three limitations are apparent: (1) It is confined to
personal representatives. 5 (2) It requires that the debtor be in
63. Ala. Code tit 613 § 227 (1960).
64. Ala. Code tit. 61, § 223 (1960). Sections 126 and 147 of the Model
Probate Code are fiduciary power statutes in form, but both rather dearly re-
quire court approval-an indication borne out by the construction of § 147 in
Nissouri and Indiana. See text accompanying note 136 infra and the Indiana
Probate Commission's comments to Ind. Ann. StaL § 7-818 (1953).
65. Alabama has a statute, similar in terms to § 227, covering trustees. Ala.
Code fit. 58, § 27 (1960). However, this is not typical of single-purpose juris-
dictions.
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distressed circumstances. (3) It is confined to claims held by
the fiduciary. The last sentence is apparently directed to family
settlenients of disputes over distribution, but it may be subject
to a construction that would extend it to compromises of claims
against the estate.66
-The fiduciary power form of statute is in force, in terms
identical to the Alabama statute, or nearly so, in fourteen other
jurisdictions.67 - In those jurisdictions, in other words, statutory
power to compromise is limited to personal representatives, to
debtors who are in distressed circumstances, and to cases where
the fiduciary holds the claim. Statutes in this form also appear
to make prior court approval of the compromise necessary, al-
though that apparent requirement has largely been construed
away.6" The Maryland 9 and Georgia" statutes, however, con-
tain a uniquely emphatic requirement of prior court approval
for valid agreements of compromise. Those statutes, and some-
what less emphatic statutes in Missouri, Indiana,72 and Texas,"
have been construed to require prior judicial approval. 4
Idaho, Washington, and Wyoming have added the Uniform
Trustees' Powers Act in recent legislative sessions,7" but that
statute is apparently not intended to affect personal representa-
tives, who continue to operate under the old statutes or under
their common-law powers. Oregon provides for jurisdiction in
local judges to augment fiduciary powers, but that statute, too,
is confined to trustees.
California, whose original single-purpose statute has been
66. The issue appears not to have come up in Alabama, probably because the
courts there do not construe the fiduciary power statute to abrogate a fiduciary's
common-law power to compromise. Arledge v. Ellison, 247 Ala. 190, 23 So. 389
(1945). See Lynn v. McDaniel, 210 Ala. 474, 98 So. 287 (1923).
67. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-474 (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 62-2403 (Supp.
1965); Guam Prob. Code § 578 (1953); Idaho Code Ann. § 15-809 (1948); Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 473.277 (Supp. 1957); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 91-3208 (1947);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-410 (1943); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 143.140 (1963); N.D. Cent.
Code § 30-13-09 (1960); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 116.130 (1965); S.D. Code § 35.1105
(Supp. 1960); Utah Code Ann. § 75-11-12 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 1410
(1958); V.I. Code Ann. tit. 15, § 570 (1964).
68. See pp. 545-49 infra.
69. Md. Ann. Code art. 93, § 286 (1964); Md. R.P. V77, § a (1961).
70. Ga. Code Ann. §§ 108-422, 113-1514 (1959).
71. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.277 (Supp. 1957).
72. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 7-705 (1953). See Ind. Ann. Stat. § 7-818 (1953), which
is based on § 147 of the Model Probate Code. The latter has not been construed
on the present question.
73. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7425b-125 (1960).
74. See pp. 542-45 infra.
75. Idaho Code Ann. §§ 68-104 to -113 (Supp. 1965); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.§§ 30.99.070-.910 (1961); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-36 to -45 (Supp. 1965).
76. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 128.110, 128.160 (1963).
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influential in western legislatures,77 recently amended its fiduciary
power statute to cover both claims against the personal representa-
tive and claims held by him."8 The California statute also broad-
ens the sort of claims it covers by keying compromise to the
"best interest of the estate," rather than to debtor distress."0
These two liberalizations of single-purpose, fiduciary power
statutes are fairly common. Eleven jurisdictions extend the
power to compromise to all kinds of claims."0 All of these statutes,
and three others,"1 dispense with the requirement that debtors
of the estate be in distress. Virginia adds a special provision
permitting submission of claims to binding arbitration, without
court approval, which covers personal representatives, guardians,
and trustees.8 2 The Illinois3 and Michigan 4 statutes cover
guardians as well as personal representatives.
Several jurisdictions make express provision for compromise
by personal representatives acting as statutory trustees in actions
for wrongful death s5 and statutes"0 or rules of court 7 in several
other states are probably broad enough to cover wrongful-death
claims, if statutory power to settle them is necessary."8 The New
Hampshire statute has a single-purpose, fiduciary power cast,
but neither provides for nor requires court approval8o The New
Jersey statute confers jurisdiction to approve on the court, but
77. See historical note following the Arizona and Guam statutes cited in note
67 supra.
78. Cal. Prob. Code § 718-5 (Supp. 1965).
79. Cal. Prob. Code § 578.
80. Fla. Stat. § 733.21 (1965); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 108-422, 113-1513 (1959);
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 3, § 215 (Smith-Hurd 1961); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 7-818 (1953);
Iowa Code Ann. §§ 633.114, 633.115 (1964); La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 3198
(1961); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2117.05 (Page 1954); S.C. Code Ann. § 19-482
(1962); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7425b-25(E) (1960); Tex. Prob. Code Ann.
§ 234(d) (1960) ; Va. Code Ann. § 8-171 (195b) ; W. Va. Code Ann. § 4211 (1961).
81. Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 59-1714 (1964); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 525.36
(1947) ; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 473.277 (Supp. 1957).
82. Va. Code Ann. § 8-507 (1950).
83. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 3, § 215 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
84. Mich. Comp. Laws § 707.9 (1948).
85. See, e.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 395.240 (1963); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch.
18, § 2403 (1964); S.C. Code Ann. § 19-482 (1962); W. Va. Code Ann. § 5476
(1961).
86. Ga. Code Ann. § 108-422, 113-1513 (1959) ; La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art.
3198 (1961); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3A:14-2 (1953); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2117.03
(Page 1954); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §§ 320.513, 320.945 (1964); RI. Gen. Laws
Ann. § 33-18-16 (1956) ; Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 234 (1960).
87. Md. R.P. V77, § a (1961).
88. See Williams v. Louisville & N.R.R., 246 F. Supp. 758 (E.D. Tenn. 1965),
which implies that statutory authority is not necessary, but finds it in the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.
89. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 554:42 (1955). See Wyman's Appeal, 13 N.H. 18
(1842).
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does not in terms require court approval.o0 Broad fiduciary power
statutes in Florida9' and Illinois 2 cover trustees and do not ap-
pear to affect older statutes?3 in those jurisdictions covering per-
sonal representatives.
The Alabama court power model is similar to statutes in a
few states that also limit the court's power to personal representa-
tives and to claims that are "bad or doubtful,"" or are due from
insolvent debtors. 95 But the more common form of court power
statute extends to all claims, for and against the estate, and does
not require debtor distress. 96 Five of these statutes cover guardi-
ans,9 7 and four cover trustees. 8 Some cover arbitrationP9 and
some cover abandonment of assets.1°° The Arkansas incorpora-
tion-by-reference statute'0 ' covers only trustees and apparently
leaves personal representatives to the older court power statute.02
2. Fiduciary Powers Statutes
The new New York Fiduciaries' Powers Act,103 like the Eng-
lish Trustee Act, 1925,104 and unlike Section 3(a) of the Uni-
form Trustees' Powers Act x5 covers both personal representa-
tives and trustees. It contains a broad, comprehensive list of
statutory powers, including the power to compromise or abandon
claims or to submit them to arbitration.100 It differs from the
uniform act principally in its coverage of personal representa-
fives and in the fact that the New York statute does not contain
90. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3A:14-1 (1953).
91. Fla. Stat. § 691.03 (1965).
92. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 148, § 35 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
93. Fla. Stat. § 733.21 (1965); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 3, § 215 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
94. Ala. Code tit. 61, § 223 (1960).
95. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-10-35 (1963).
96. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 45-231 (1958); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch, 18, §
2403 (1964); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 204, §§ 13-14 (1955); Pa. Stat, Ann. tit.
20, § 320.513 (1964); RI. Gen. Laws Ann. § 33-18-16 (1956).
97. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-10-35 (1963); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §
45-231 (1958); Md. Ann. Code art. 93, § 286 (1964); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
204, § 13 (1955) ; RI. Gen. Laws Ann. § 33-18-16 (1956).
98. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 45-231 (1958); Md. R.P. V77, § a (1961); Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 204, § 14 (1955); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, §§ 320.932, 320.945
(1964).
99. E.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 18, § 2403 (1964).
100. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 320.932 (1964); RJ. Gen. Laws Ann. § 33-18-16
(1956).
101. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 58-114 to -116 (Supp. 1965).
102. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 62-2403 (Supp. 1965).
103. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law §.127(1) (Supp. 1965).
104. 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 19, 15.
105. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
1964 Handbook 267-68.
106. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 127(2) (q) (Supp. 1965).
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the "prudent man" catch-all. 7  suggested by Professor
Fratcher.108 The New York act, unlike the English statute, con-
tains no provision permitting courts to relieve trustees for
breaches of trust in good faith° 9-- a provision that may be rel-
evant to the express statutory power to compromise claims.
Arkansas,110 North Carolina," and Tennessee'2 have
broad incorporation-by-reference statutes, but these are less
pervasive than statutes that confer statutory powers because they
depend on the advertence of the draftsman.113 The Arkansas
statute covers only trustees; the North Carolina and Tennessee
statutes cover both executors and trustees . 14 Oregon's judicial-
augmentation statute,"' less pervasive than statutes that confer
statutory powers in that judicial action is necessary to its appli-
cation,1 6 covers only trustees; as to trustees, however, Oregon's
provision justifies judicial augmentation of a power to compro-
mise. Virginia 7 and Oklahoma 1  have special statutes on fidu-
ciary powers to submit claims to arbitration.
Most states have no statutes conferring power to compromise
on trustees, although several have extended their single-purpose
statutes to cover trustees," 9 and some few even to cover guardi-
ans."2  The Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, where adopted,"'
covers trustees in the broadest terms. In a few other states,
statutes' patterned on the Uniform Trust Administration Act, or
107. Section 3(a) of the uniform act, supra note 105, states: "[A] trustee
has the power to perform, without court authorization, every act which a prudent
man would perform for the purposes of the trust...."
108. Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 627, 660 (1962).
109. Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 19, § 61. See text accompanying
note 182 infra.
110. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 58-114 to -116 (Supp.,1965).
111. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 32-25 to -27 (Supp. 1965).
112. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 35-616 to -619 (Supp. 1965).
113. See Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 627, 659
(1962).
114. Neither the New York, North Carolina, nor Tennessee statute, however,
covers guardians.
115. Ore. Rev. StaL § 128.110, 128.160 (1965).
116. See Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 627, 659
(1962).
117. Va. Code Ann. § 8-507 (1957).
118. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 58, § 348 (1965).
119. Ga. Code Ann. § 108-422 (1959); NJ. Rev. Stat. §§ 3A:14-1 to -4
(1953); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8-171, 8-507 (1957); statutes cited in note 98 supra.
120. Ga. Code Ann. § 108-422 (1959); NJ. Rev. Stat. §§ 3A:14-1 to -4
(1953); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8-171, 8-507 (1957); statutes cited in note 97 supra.
121. See note 75 supra.
122. Fla. Stat. 1 691.03 (1965); 11. Ann. Stat. ch. 148, § 35 (Smith-Hurd
1964); Okla. Stat. Ann. fit. 60; § 175.24 (1963); TeL Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
7425b-25 (1960).
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statutes'2 perhaps more sui generis than that, cover trustee power
to compromise or abandon claims, or to submit them to arbitra-
tion, in broad terms and without any provision for court approval.
C. The Effect of Express Statutory Power
The New York Commission on Estates treated its proposal
to grant by. statute express powers to compromise claims as a
codification of existing case law.2 4 That may or may not be the
view that New York courts will take. In New York and in other
states, in any event, courts have taken a more fundamental view
of the purpose and effect of express statutory powers. There are
one or more of three possible views of the effect of express statu-
tory power to compromise claims: (1) the view that the statute
imposes prior judicial review on compromise transactions; (2)
the view that the statute, if complied with, protects the fiduciary
from surcharge for imprudence; and (3) the view that the statute
assures the validity of compromise transactions-in other words,
that it protects third persons who compromise with the fiduciary.
1. The Mandatory-Review Position
A few states have taken the position that their single-pur-
pose statutes, which typically provide for judicial approval of
compromises before they are made, or for local court jurisdiction
to grant approval, operate to limit the common-law power of
compromise which fiduciaries would otherwise have. Fiduciaries
must, in these states, submit compromise transactions for prior
judicial approval. To fail to do so is apparently a breach of trust
in itself, and a breach that imperils the validity of compromise
transactions and therefore jeopardizes the title of third persons
who deal with the fiduciary. The statutes are construed, in other
words, to be primarily supervisory, rather than primarily a pro-
tection against surcharge or invalidity.
The Maryland " and Georgia'20 statutes rather clearly com-
pel prior judicial approval of compromises by fiduciaries, and the
Maryland court has added to the statute, by way of court rule,127
123. Iowa Code Ann. § 633.699(1) (1964); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2121
(1965). The legislative history of the Louisiana statute indicates that it is a
codification of Restatement § 192 and is not intended to change existing law. La.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2121, comments a, b (1965).
'124. N.Y. Temporary Comm'n on Estates, Third Report 18-19 (1964). See
Hendrickson, The New Fiduciaries' Powers Act, 37 N.Y. St. B.J. 338, 340 (1965),
where the author states that the statutory power to compromise is a codification.
The same judgment about the uniform act is made in Horowitz, Uniform Trustees'
Powers Act, 41 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1966).
125. Md. Ann. Code art. 93, § 286 (1964).
126. Ga. Code Ann. § 108-422 (1959).
127. Md. R.P. V77 (1961).
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an elaborate procedural apparatus. The Maryland statute extends
to personal representatives and guardians ad litem; the Georgia
statute extends to "all persons acting in a fiduciary capacity."
Maryland's provision was put squarely in issue in Blunt v.
Fox,1'2 where an administrator, acting without judicial authoriza-
tion, compromised a claim against the estate and claimed on his
accounting credit for what he paid. The probate judge's denial of
the credit was modified on appeal, to allow the administrator to
file a new accounting to demonstrate that his compromise was
prudent. The court said that the statute meant what it said; the
only valid compromise is one approved in advance by the pro-
bate judge. But, the court held, the compromise might still be
approved, on accounting, if the administrator could demonstrate
that it was prudently made and that his delay in seeking judicial
approval worked no prejudice to the estate. The burden of proof
on this tardy issue of propriety, the court said, was on the execu-
tor-as to his good faith, as to the fact of the compromise, and
as to its benefit to the estate. The opinion certainly encourages
personal representatives in Maryland to seek immediate judicial
approval of compromises, but it avoids the logical rigor of the
statute. Blun v. Fox does not, in other words, put Maryland
back to 1700. Dicta 9 from the Maryland court three years after
Blum v. Fox, however, made it clear that an agreement without
court approval is probably invalid, at least until compliance with
Blunt v. Fox gives the agreement nunc pro tunc validity.
The later Maryland case also involved a catch-all powers
clause in a will, which, the court said, did not affect the require-
ment of prior judicial approval, although the statute can prob-
ably be waived by advertent language permitting compromise
without statutory approval. The 1941 Maryland dicta referred
to an estate debtor who claimed the benefit of the statute to
fasten invalidity on a compromise agreement. In a recent and
somewhat similar case, the federal district court in Maryland
found valid a personal representative's agreement with a liability
insurer, against the insurer's contention that the agreement was
invalid if not approved by the probate court.1:0 The Maryland
statute, the federal judge said, "is intended for the benefit of
128. ,173 Md. 527,197 AtI. 117 (1938).
129. Turk v. Grossman, 179 Md. 229, 234, 17 A.2d 122, 124 (1941): "While
this court has sanctioned approval after a good compromise has been made... it
has never placed the action entirely within the discretion of the personal rep-
resentative. 2'
130. Neighbors v. Harleysville Mlut. Gas. Co, 169 F. Supp. 638 (D. Md.
19S9).
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creditors and beneficiaries of the estate, and not for the benefit
of insurers who have denied liability.' 131
The Missouri statute132 has also been construed to require
prior judicial approval, 33 although similar provisions in other
states have been construed to leave unaffected the personal rep-
resentative's common-law power to compromise claims.' 34 The
issue apparently arose for the first time in a 1925 opinion of the
St. Louis Court of Appeals,""5 but it was definitely clarified by the
Missouri Supreme Court ten years later. The judicial-approval
statute, the court said, "is a limitation upon the power and au-
thority of executors and administrators, and it contemplates safe-
guarding estates by requiring a satisfactory showing to the
probate court . .. that any settlement for less than the full
amount is, under the circumstances, beneficial to the estate."30
The failure to obtain approval in that case rendered the agreement
of compromise invalid. Dicta in a more recent case limits the
application of the statutory apparatus to personal representatives
and suggests that trustees in Missouri can compromise claims
without prior judicial approval. 37
Georgia,'38 Kentucky, 1 9 and Texas 40 authority parallels
Blum v. Fox and comes to the same conclusion-that judicial
approval is essential to valid compromise. The Texas decision
recognizes that a prudent compromise can be approved and in
effect validated nunc pro tunc on accounting. An early California
opinion" said that prior judicial approval was essential to valid
compromise in that state, but it has been disapproved in later
opinions."' A sale-of-personal-property case in Oklahoma, 4 ' and
a passing implication in an Arizona opinion, 44 suggest that those
131. This seems to beg the question, since the liability insurer appears to
have stood in the same position as an estate debtor.
132. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 473.277, 473.427 (Supp. 1957).
133. Jasper v. Thomas, 124 Kan. 163, 257 Pac. 714 (.1927) (applying Missouri
law); Wayland v. Pendleton, 337 Mo. 190, 85 S.W.2d 492 (1935). Cf. Boatmens
Nat'l Bank v. Bolles, 356 Mo. 489, 202 S.W.2d 53 (1947).
134. See note 154 infra.
136. Scott v. Crider, 217 Mo. App. 1, 272 S.W. 1010 (1925).
136. Wayland v. Pendleton, 337 Mo. 190, 199, 85 S.W.2d 492, 495 (1935).
137. Memmel v. Thomas, 238 Mo. App. 403, 408, 181 S.W.2d 168, 170 (1944).
But d. Boatmen's Nat'1 Bank v. Bolles, 356 Mo. 489, 202 S.W.2d 53 (1947).
138. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Cohran, 106 Ga. App. 14, 126 S.E.2d
289 (1962).
139. Hudson's Adm'x v. Collins, 239 Ky. 134, 38 S.W.2d 975 (1931). But
see Gill v. Anglo-American Ass'n, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 690, 52 S.W. 929 (1899).
140. Scott v. Taylor, 294 S.W. 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
141. Taylor v. Sanson, 24 Cal. App. 516, 141 Pac. 1060 (Dist. Ct. App. 1914).
142. See note 154 infra.
143. Warner v. Mason, 109 Okla. 13, 234 Pac. 747 (1925).
144. Matter of Estate of Hannerkam, 51 Ariz. 447, 451, 77 P.2d 814, 816
(1938).
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two states may adopt a supervisory construction of their single-
purpose statutes.
Several states, therefore, conceive of their single-purpose
statutes as radically restricting the common-law power of fidu-
ciaries, and replacing it with a firm demand for prior judicial
approval of agreements of compromise. Without approval the
agreements are invalid, and fiduciaries who make them are sub-
ject to surcharge. (The Blum v. Fox theory of nunc pro tunc
validation affords some relief from this rigor without detracting
from the theoretical integrity of a supervisory construction of
the statute.) These opinions therefore construe powers statutes
to replace fiduciary discretion with judicial discretion. It is worth
noting that none of the statutes involved have been modern fidu-
ciary-power statutes.
2. The Freedom-From-Surcharge and Assured-Validity
Positions
Most courts, construing single-purpose statutes that provide
procedural machinery for prior judicial approval of compromises,
hold that the statutes do not affect the fiduciary's common-law
power. This means that a fiduciary may proceed without judicial
approval, but, if he does, the propriety of his action, and maybe
even the validity of the transaction, are open on accounting. Judi-
cial intervention, which usually can be invoked ex parte,1"5 pro-
tects the fiduciary from any surcharge except surcharge for bad
faith, and it assures the validity of the transaction if the third
party has acted in good faith. The statutory construction in most
courts, in other words, gives the fiduciary a choice; he can de-
fend his compromise on a petition for approval, or in his account-
ing.146
New York, in Ckouteau v. Suydam, had established this
construction before the Civil War:
The object of that statute was, not to confer upon executors and
administrators powers which otherwise they would not possess,
but to afford them additional protection, when acting in good
145. See, e.g., In re Patenotre's Estate, 138 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Surr. Ct. 1955).
146. A fiduciary who has decided to compromise a claim .. may enter into
the compromise on his own authority, without the prior approval of the
court or the estate beneficiaries.... His action might be subject to
challenge in a later accounting on the ground of imprudence, as well as
bad faith .... The fiduciary may make an ex partc application to the
court ... for approval of the compromise. If the court authorizes the
proposed compromise, the fiduciary can thereafter be held accountable only
if the "claim was fraudulently compromised or compounded." . .. In
that proceeding, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, might direct the
fiduciary to give notice.... However, it is not essential to the jurisdiction
of the court ....
Id. at 901.
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faith in the exercise of their common-law powers. Although they
could compromise a claim, or compound a debt, without the aid
of the statute, still they might perhaps be held responsible for
any serious error in judgment, in so doing. The act in question
enables them to obtain the sanction of the judgment of the sur-
rogate, in addition to their own, and this affords them additional
protection, if their conduct is fair and honest.1 47
This position was taken where an executor compromised a claim
asserted against the estate, but it is also the law where the claim
is asserted by the estate,148 and where the agreement involved
deals with distributees rather than debtors or creditors. 4 The
New York cases abound with routine approvals of compromised
claims, 5 ' as well as a few thorough discussions of the facts that
bear on judicial approval.'
There is also in the New York cases a tendency to protect
the validity of the settlement, as distinguished from its propriety,
in any case in which the third party dealing with the fiduciary
acts in good faith. Even where the fiduciary relies on his com-
mon-law power and fails to obtain judicial approval, the New
York cases suggest that a third party is protected from a finding
that the settlement is invalid because the fiduciary acted im-
prudently or fraudulently. Scully v. McGrath 2 illustrates the
point. There an administratrix overpaid a distributee of the
estate, whom the court treated, in effect, as a creditor. The trans-
action was, the court said, a clear wasting of estate assets. But
the liability of the administratrix and the validity of the settle-
ment were separate questions. "[H] er liability for the imprudent
settlement .. and his liability .. to return the money received
147. 21 N.Y. 179, 183-84 (1860). See Matter of Estate of Leopold, 259 N.Y.
274, 181 N.E. 570 (1932); Scully v. McGrath, 201 N.Y. 61, 94 N.E. 195 (1911);
Matter of Estate of Lester, 155 Misc. 536, 280 N.Y. Supp. 341 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
148. Matter of Estate of Ballenzweig, 174 Misc. 1109, 22 N.Y.S.2d 541
(Surr. Ct. 1940) (claim against estate); In re Scott, 1 Red. 234 (N.Y. Surr. Ct.
1877) (claim by estate). Accord, Yates v. Cockerham, 156 Ore. 245, 67 P.2d 269
(1937) (dicta).
149. Griffin v. Sturges, 131 Conn. 471, 40 A.2d 758 (.1944); Murdoch v.
Murdoch, 418 Pa. 219, 210 A.2d 490 (1965). Contra, Protective Check Writer Co.
v. Collins, 92 N.H. 27, 23 A.2d 770 (1942).
150. Haidacker v. Central R.R., 52 F. Supp. 713 (E.D.N.Y. 1943); Capasso
v. Kingston Trust Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 976, 225 N.Y.S.2d 776 (3d Dep't 1962);
Gomez v. Gomez, 33 App. Div. 379, 54 N.Y. Sppp. 237 (.1st Dep't 1898); Matter
of Wheeler, 28 Misc. 2d 787, 217 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Surr. Ct. 1961); In re Purcell's
Will, 26 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Surr. Ct. 1941); Matter of Estate of Hilpert, 165 Misc.
430, 300 N.Y. Supp. 886 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
151. See Matter of Estate of Hammer, 33 Misc. 2d 674, 224 N.Y.S.2d 717
(Surr. Ct. 1962) ; In re Ledyard's Estate, 21 N.Y.S.2d 860, 886-89 (Surr. Ct. 1939),
aff'd mem., 259 App. Div. 892, 20 N.Y.S.2d -1006 (2d Dep't 1940). See also Jones
v. Jones, 297 Mass. 198, 7 N.E.2d 1015 (1937).
152. 201 N.Y. 61, 94 N.E. 195 (1911).
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by him are very different things," the court said. "He had the
right to make the claim and he was not obliged to resort to law
to enforce it if its justice was conceded by the administratrix.
An... administrator has the power to ... compromise claims
... and a settlement made by him can be set aside only upon
proof of bad faith or fraud." This left, as the only factual issue,
bad faith on the part of the third party. That was a jury ques-
tion, the court said, and it was sufficient in defense to show "a
bona fide claim and its settlement." 5 3 Most jurisdictions follow
New York's lead on both of these questions. The weight of au-
thority is that single-purpose powers statutes which contain pro-
cedural apparatus for prior judicial approval of settlements do
not disturb the fiduciary's common-law power.Y4 New York's pro-
tection of third parties, under the Scidly rule, is also probably
followed in most jurisdictions, 155 although there are a few dis-
153. Id. at 64, 94 N.E. at 196.
154. Redmond v. Commerce Trust Co., 144 F.2d 140 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
323 'U.S. 776 (1944) (dicta); Moss v. Moose, 184 Ark. 798, 44 S.W.2d 825 (1931) ;
Evans v. Tucker, 101 Fla. 688, 135 So. 305 (1931); In re Estate of Fleming, 228
Iowa 1137, 293 N.W. 511 (1940); Boill v. Maloney, 342 Mass. 399, 173 N.E.2d 283
(1961); First & Am. Natl Bank v. Whiteside, 207 Minn. 537, 292 N.W. 770 (1940);
Butler v. Butler, 180 Minn. 134, 230 N.W. 575 (1930). But see Penn Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Roberts, 120 Fla. 392, 162 So. 881 (1935) ; Pangalos v. Halpern, 247 Minn. 80
76 N.W.2d 702 (.1956) ; McGill v. Bison Fast Freight, Inc., 245 N.C. 469, 96 S.E.2d
438 (1957). See also Matter of Estate of Ives, 248 N.C. 176, 102 S.E2d 807 (1958).
This result was accomplished with clarity in the early New England cases. Blake
v. Ward, 137 Mass. 94 (1884). See Wallin v. Smolesky, 303 Mass. 39, 20 N.E.2d
406 (1939); Jones v. Jones, 297 Mass. 198, 7 N.E.2d 1015 (1937). The Connecticut
authorities limit exposure for fiduciary imprudence to surcharge. Johnson's Appeal,
71 Conn. 590, 595, 42 Adt. 662, 666 (1899); Hutchins v. Johnson, 12 Conn. 376
(1837). Cf. Marks' Appeal, 116 Conn. 58, 163 Ad. 600 (1932) ; Union & New Haven
Trust Co. v. Sherwood, 110 Conn. 150, 147 At. 562 (1929). Both the Massachusetts
and Connecticut cases suggest a generous open-door policy on judicial approval.
See, e.g, Griffin v. Sturges, 131 Conn. 471, 40 A.2d 758 (1944). But the New
Hampshire statute, which contained no provision for prior judicial approval, was
construed to deny jurisdiction for approval, even when the settlement agreement
called for it. Protective Check Writer Co. v. Collins, 92 N.H. 27, 23 A.2d 770
(1942). Cf. Phinney v. Cheshire County Say. Bank, 91 N.H. 184, 16 A.2d 363
(1940). See also Burtman v. Butman, 94 N.H. 412, 54 A.2d 367 (1947). Early doubt
that California would follow the majority rule should have been removed by In re
Richards' Estate, 17 Cal. 2d 259, 109 P.2d 923 (1940). See also Hartman v. Bank
of America, 137 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1943); Jenkins v. Southern Pac. Co., 17 F.
Supp. 820 (S.D. Cal. 1937), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Jenkins v. Pullman
Co, 96 F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1938), aff'd, 305 U.S. 534 (1939); Estate of WAilson, 116
Cal. App. 2d 523, 253 P.2d 1011 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
155. Arledge v. Ellison, 247 Ala. 190, 23 So. 2d 389 (1945); Wunderlich v.
Bowen, 193 Ark. 284, 100 S.W.2d 80 (1936); Gill v. Anglo-American Ass'n, 21
Ky. L. Rep. 690, 52 S.W. 929 (1899) ; First & Am. Natl Bank v. Whiteside, 207
Minn. 537, 292 N.W. 770 (1940); Montgomery v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 111 Miss.
6, 7.1 So. 162 (1916); Yates v. Cockerham, 156 Ore. 245, 67 P.2d 269 (1937);
Denney v. Parker, 10 Wash. 218, 38 Pac. 1018 (1894). Cf. Estate of Shultz, 103
Colo. 184, 85 P.2d 736 (1938). Jones v. Jones, 297 Mass. 198, 7 NX.2d 1015 (1937),
made this result fairly clear in Massachusetts, but indicated that the third person
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turbing judicial excursions into propriety in cases where the
question is one of validity,50 and judicial language in at least
one important jurisdiction (Pennsylvania) has drastically mud-
dled the distinction.
Early Pennsylvania authority was clear in indicating to third
parties who settled in good faith with fiduciaries that, even with-
out judicial approval, their settlements were valid. In Struthers v.
Peltz, 15 7 for instance, the court held an estate bound by a release
of a lien on land, as to a subsequent purchaser of the land. The
case did not involve a debtor or creditor, but the language of the
opinion could be applied to a compromised claim:
If executors will cheat the estate they represent, we cannot help
the matter at the expense of innocent persons. The testator trusted
them to conduct his business, and if they abuse the trust and
cannot make compensation themselves, it would be a violation
of the dullest moral sense to repair the wrongs of the estate by
making reprisals upon innocent strangers.118
Application of Struthers to a clear case of the fiduciary dealing
for the estate with a third party was at least complicated, though,
when in 1915 the same court held estate beneficiaries not bound
by an executor's receipts for coal deliveries.""9 Doubt was com-
pounded by the court's majority and dissenting opinions in Pearl-
man's Estate.'
Pearlman transferred assets to a trust created for the benefit
of his creditors. The creditors had apparently agreed to keep in
force certain life insurance on the transferor's life by making
contributions toward the payment of premiums. However, one of
the creditors itself later came upon evil days and was placed in
receivership. Its liquidating trustee was without assets to continue
contributions to the premium fund, and wrote the trustee for
creditors, abandoning its interest in the policy. "[W]e specifi-
cally waive any possible participation.. ," the letter said.1"1
was expected to prove sufficient consideration-possibly because a lack of con-
sideration would be evidence of fraud. Blake v. Ward, 137 Mass. 94 (.1884), would
suggest that the only test is fraud. New Hampshire has muddled the validity-
propriety distinction. Simes v. Ward, 78 N.H. 533, 103 At. 310 (1918). But later
cases show hope of correction. See Burtman v. Butman, 94 N.Z. 412, 54 A.2d 367
(1947); Protective Check Writer Co. v. Collins, 92 N.H. 27, 23 A.2d 770 (1942).
156. Belcher v. Cobb, 169 N.C. 689, 86 SXE. 600 (1915); Ellenberg v. Arthur,
178 S.C. 490, 183 S.E. 306 (1936) (involving fraudulently obtained letters of ad-
ministration) ; Purcell v. Robertson, 122 W. Va. 287, 8 S.E.2d 881 (1940). Cf. Marks'
Appeal, 116 Conn. 58, 163 At. 600 (1932).
157. 18 Pa. 278 (1852).
158. Id. at 280.
159. Tustin v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 250 Pa. 425, 95 At.
595 (1915).
160. 348 Pa. 488, 35 A.2d 418 (1944).
161. Id. at 491, 35 A.2d at 419.
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After Pearlman's death, and after the policies had ripened
into liquid cash, the creditor's liquidating trustee demanded par-
ticipation in the proceeds and asserted that his waiver of par-
ticipation was invalid. The case presented a clear opportunity to
assert the validity of the fiduciary's abandonment of an estate
claim, even though abandonment may have been improper.
The Pennsylvania court noted, first, that the fiduciary's
common-law power to compromise and abandon claims was un-
fettered. But, the liquidating trustee argued, this was neither com-
promise nor abandonment; it was, he said, a gift of estate assets.
The court did not agree, and held for the creditors' trust, but its
opinion clearly implied that, if the liquidating trustee had acted
imprudently, his waiver of participation would have been in-
valid." 2 The dissenters, in fact, argued that the waiver was invalid
because the liquidating trustee should have borrowed money and
continued participation in the life insurance arrangement-in
other words, that the waiver was invalid because of the fiduciary's
imprudent action.'3 Neither opinion suggests a distinction be-
tween validity and propriety, even though, in this case, the fidu-
ciary obviously had power to waive participation. The court
should have made that distinction, as it was made in New York;
it should have held the'waiver of the liquidating trustee binding
and final, absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the trustee
for creditors. Its failure to do so increased the confusion that had
already been imposed on the language of the Struthers opinion.
A later opinion from the same court fortunately suggests that in-
validity of a settlement agreement is not established without clear
and convincing evidence of fraud on the part of the third party,",
but that opinion does not entirely remove the Pearlman confusion
from Pennsylvania trust law.
By and large, though, it appears to be the law that validity is
protected if the settlement is accomplished by good faith on the
part of the third party. If the fiduciary acts imprudently, he is
open to surcharge on accounting. This exposure can be eliminated
by prior judicial approval of the settlement. If the fiduciary acts
fraudulently, he is open to surcharge on accounting, and ex-
posure to surcharge for fraud is not eliminated by prior judicial
approval.' 5
162. Id. at 491-93, 35 A.2d at 419-20.
163. Id. at 494,497-99, 35 A.2d at 421-23.
164. Murdoch v. Murdoch, 418 Pa. 219, 210 A.2d 490 (1965). See Yoffe Estate,
9 Pa. D. & C.2d 281 (Orphans' Ct. 1956).
165. Cases that directly involve either actions to enforce compromise agree-
ments or actions that collaterally attack them generally support the valid-except-
for-fraud conclusion where the agreements have had prior judicial approval, where
they have been approved on accounting, and where they have not been judicially
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D. Express Powers To Compromise Claims in Instruments
Dumaine v. Dumaine... is to powers clauses in instruments
what Claflin v. Claflin0 7 is to trust termination or Harvard Col-
lege v. Amory'68 to trust investment; it is a fiduciary beacon, shin-
ing out from Massachusetts, guiding almost everybody. Dumaine
did not involve trustees' powers to compromise claims, but it
opened the door for Edelstein v. Old Colony Trust Co.,a"' which
did. In Dumaine, the Massachusetts court found that a broad
power to allocate proceeds between income and principal dis-
penses with statutory guidelines for fiduciaries. "[W]hen a
settlor reposes a discretion in a trustee, he does so because he
desires the honest judgment of the trustee, perhaps even to the
exclusion of that of the court." 70 The court held that it could not
interfere with the trustee there, even though he bad allocated a
capital gain to the trust's income account.
approved. See, as to the proposition that the agreements are valid unless fraudulent,
Dockery v. Central Ariz. Light & Power Co., 45 Ariz. 434, 45 P.2d 656 (1935);
Jasper v. Thomas, 124 Kan. 163, 257 Pac. 714 (1927) (applying Missouri law);
Boxill v. Maloney, 342 Mass. 399, 173 N.E.2d 283 (1961); Beede v. Old Colony
Trust Co., 321 Mass. 115, 71 N.E.2d 882 (1947); Matter of Estate of Gardiner,
204 Misc. 884, 126 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Surr. Ct. 1953). See also Anderson v. Clough,
191 Ore. 292, 230 P.2d 204 (1951). On the use of specific enforcement and other
forms of equitable relief see Cook v. Richardson, 178 Mass. 125, 59 N.E. 675
(1901); Burtman v. Butman, 94 N.H. 412, 54 A.2d 367 (.1947); Matter of Estate
of Finkelstein, 1 Misc. 2d 1067, 148 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Surr. Ct. 1955), aff'd mom.,
6 App. Div. 2d 1055, 179 N.Y.S.2d 662 (2d Dep't 1958). Cf. Beede v. Old Colony
Trust Co., 321 Mass. 115, 7,1 N.E.2d 882 (1947); Coffin v. Cottle, 21 Mass. (4
Pick.) 454 (1827). But see Bartlett v. Slater, 211 Mass. 334, 97 NXE. 991 (1912) ;
Amato v. City of New York, 36 Misc. 2d 899, 233 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1962). Fraud
vitiates an agreement of settlement. Alabama Co. v. Brown, 207 Ala. 18, 92 So. 490
(1921); Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Gipe, ,160 Ind. 360, 370, 372, 65 N.E.
1034, 1038-39 (1903) (dicta). Cf. Guthrie v. Gaskins, 184 Ga. 537, 192 S.E. 36
(1937); Campbell v. Atlanta Coach Co., 58 Ga. App. 824, 826, 200 S.E. 203, 205-
06 (1938). Several cases indicate a rigorous definition of fraud for these pur-
poses. Jones v. Jones, 297 Mass. 198, 7 N.E.2d 1015 (1937); Matter of Estate of
Bush, 53 Wash. 2d 67, 330 P.2d 373 (1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959). See
Matter of Estate of Trapani, 21 111. App. 2d 19, 157 N.E.2d 83 (1959); Kinlon v.
Riley, 310 Mass. 338, 37 N.E.2d 984 (1941). There are a few disturbing examples
of judges going deeper than the fraud issue in an action to enforce or to attack
agreements of compromise. Carr v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 180 Ala. 159, 60 So. 277
(1912) (validity of fiduciary's letters); Morris v. Boyd, 110 Ark. 468, 162 S.V. 69
(1913) (comparison of terms of settlement with terms of will); Moeller v. Poland,
80 Ohio St. 418, 89 N.E. 100 (1909) (reviewing prudence of agreement). See
Upton v. Dennis, 133 Mich. 238, 94 N.V. 728 (1903) (discussing adequacy of
consideration). Morris v. Boyd, 110 Ark. 468, 162 S.W. 69 (1913), and Belcher v.
Cobb, 169 N.C. 689, 86 S.E. 600 (1915), distinguish between a compromise and a
gift by the fiduciary to a third person. See also Pullins' Adm'r v. Smith, 106 Ky.
418, 50 S.V. 833 (1899).
166. 301 Mass. 214, 16 N.E.2d 625 (1938).
167. 149 Mass. .19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889).
168. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
169. 336 Mass. 659, 147 N.E.2d 193 (1958).
170. 301 Mass. at 222, 16 N.E.2d at 629.
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Edelstein, twenty years later, was a dispute between a dece-
dent's executor and widow and his other distributees. The under-
lying issue involved an antenuptial agreement, but the specific
issue centered around the executor's compromise with the widow
on claims arising from the antenuptial agreement and on the valu-
ation of an insurance business which was the estate's principal
asset. Distributees other than the widow petitioned to remove the
executor for an imprudent compromise. The executor countered
with a petition to the trial court to approve the compromise. He
pointed to a sentence in the will: "'My executor and trustees...
shall have the power to compound or compromise any debts owing
to the executor or trustees or any other claims, and to pay any
debts or claims against the executor or trustees upon any evidence
which to them shall seem sufficient.' ,,7
The Massachusetts court thought that Dumaine compelled
recognition of the principle that this express language made it
inappropriate to substitute judicial discretion for fiduciary dis-
cretion on the propriety of the compromise. Only dishonesty or
fraud would justify interference with that discretion. The court
went on to note that the trial judge had approved the compromise,
and that the compromise had been found reasonably prudent
within the guidelines set in Section 192 of the Restatement of
Trusts, and that these circumstances made the compromise ap-
propriate even in the absence of express fiduciary power in the
instrument.
The consequence of Edelstein's extending the Dumaine
principle to powers to compromise claims seems to be that the
fiduciary with an express power has the same protection-and can
give the same protection to third parties dealing with him-as he
would have with prior judicial approval of the compromise. I
have been able to find no authority expressly making that trans-
ference, but there are a number of cases,1 72 from a number of
jurisdictions, which are consistent with it, and obviously place
significant weight on the fact that instruments involved in those
cases contained express powers. Cases from the few jurisdictions
that hold that prior judicial approval of compromises is essential
seem to indicate that express powers in the instrument would dis-
pense with the statutory requirement and restore to the fiduciary
171. 336 Mass. at 662, ,147 N.E.2d at 196-97.
172. Burgess v. Nail, 103 F.2d 37 (10th Cir. 1939); Second Nat'1 Bank v.
Woodworth, 66 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1933) (applying Michigan law); Brackett v.
Middlesex Banking Co., 89 Conn. 645, 95 At. 12 (1915). See Sargent, Sins of Over-
sight in Wills and Trusts, 30 B.U.L. Rev. 301, 305 (1950), in which a Mlassachu-
setts estate-planner finds an express power to compromise claims essential to a well-
drafted will
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his common-law power to compromise."73 Whether those opinions
can be stretched so far as to say that an express-power clause has
the same effect judicial approval would have in those states is
probably debatableY.7 4
E. Preliminary Conclusion and Some Conjecture on the
New Fiduciary Powers Statutes
Enough has been developed from the cases to justify a pre-
liminary conclusion on the two immediate consequences of a
fiduciary's power to compromise claims-validity and propriety:
1. At common law, a compromise is proper only if prudently
made, in good faith, for the best interests of the fiduciary estate.
If the settlement is imprudent, or made in bad faith, or not in the
best interests of the estate, the fiduciary is exposed to surcharge.
Absent bad faith in the person with whom the fiduciary compro-
mised, however, the compromise is valid.
2. If the jurisdiction has a statute providing for prior judi-
cial approval of the compromise, and if the fiduciary complies
with the statute, the compromise is valid if the third party entered
it in good faith, even in those jurisdictions which make its validity
subject to prudence and estate benefit when prior judicial ap-
proval is not obtained. The third party is protected from anything
except his own participation in a breach of trust. And the fiduciary
is protected from surcharge if he acted in good faith. He need not
fear surcharge for imprudence or lack of estate benefit; the com-
promise, judicially approved in advance, is proper.
3. Despite the existence of statutes providing for judicial ap-
proval of settlements, the fiduciary who acts without judicial
approval is no worse off than he would be at common law. That
is, both the validity and the propriety of the settlement are open
on accounting. Even in those jurisdictions which require prior
judicial approval, courts will approve settlements nunc pro tunc,
if the fiduciary, on accounting, demonstrates good faith, prudence,
and benefit to the estate.
,173. Turk v. Grossman, 179 Md. 229, 17 A.2d 122 (1941); Wayland v.
Pendleton, 337 Mo. 190, 85 S.W.2d 492 (1935).
174. Wayland involved an express power to sell assets to pay legacies; the
court held this inapplicable to the compromise it was considering because the
legacies had already been paid. Turk involved a catch-all powers clause, about
which the court said:
An authorization in the will to the executors to do all that the testator
might do personally could not, as the court interprets it, be taken to
authorize their making any addition to a debt by the estate. There are
many acts which a testator might do personally, such as the complete
release of a debt, which nobody would include within that authority, and
we think the addition to the claim here is equally outside of it.
179 Md. at 234-35, 17 A.2d at 124.
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4. Fiduciaries who are not included in statutes on prior
judicial approval may, in most states, submit compromises for
judicial approval. Approval operates in their cases the same as it
operates on fiduciaries who are under the statutes. However,
states that require prior judicial approval of some fiduciary com-
promises apparently treat fiduciaries who are not under the statute
as they would be treated at common law.
5. Procedural machinery for prior judicial approval is typical
of single-purpose, fiduciary-power statutes. Modern comprehen-
sive fiduciary-power statutes contain no provisions for prior ju-
dicial approval of compromises. Modern statutes adopting or
similar to the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, however, often con-
tain express protection of third persons, and thus apparently as-
sure validity to those persons who act in good faith.
6. Clauses in instruments that expressly confer broad powers
of compromise operate the same way prior judicial approval
operates-that is, a fiduciary who acts within an express power is
assured of validity and propriety, if he acts in good faith. (There
is a certain compelling logic about this conclusion, and no author-
ity dead against it. However, authorities directly supporting it are
something less than overwhelming.)
The question remaining for discussion here is whether ex-
press powers in modern, comprehensive powers statutes have the
same effect express powers in instruments have. In other words:
Will the Edestein principle extend to compromises under an ex-
press statutory power thereby assuring validity and propriety to
all compromises in the absence of bad faith?
It is radical, but safely radical, to predict that the power to
compromise stated in the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act will be
construed to extend the Edelstein principle. That act, now that
Professor Fratcher is finished with it, contains a broad prudent-
man standard, conferring undefined trustee powers in addition to
those stated--"a trustee has the power to perform, without court
authorization, every act which a prudent man would perform for
the purposes of the trust .... ,"7i In addition to that, it contains
broad language protecting third parties when they deal in good
faith with the fiduciary.17 ' The express power to compromise
175. Uniform Trustees' Powers Act § 3(a), in The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1964 Handbook 267.
176. With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee or assisting
a trustee in the conduct of a transaction, the existence of trust powers
and their proper exercise by the trustee may be assumed without inquiry.
The third person is not bound to inquire whether the trustee has power
to act or is properly exercising the power; and the third person, without
actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly
exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with the trustee as if the
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claims,'77 plus the prudent man power, plus third-party protec-
tion, ought surely to be as broad in effect as the express clause in
the Edelstein instrument was-that is, it ought to protect fiduci-
aries and third parties alike from any defect except bad faith.
The new New York Fiduciaries' Powers Act 178 lacks the
prudent-man power and the broad third-party protection. Exten-
sion of Edelstein in New York therefore may appear more de-
batable. However, the Scully rule obtains in New York, under
which third parties are protected when they deal in good faith,
and that judge-made standard would seem to cover most of what,
for present purposes, Section 7 of the Uniform Trustees' Powers
Act covers. In addition, the language of the power to compromise
claims in the New York act is broad, and it covers all kinds of
fiduciaries. 79 Also, the New York courts have held for a long time
that fiduciary power to compromise claims at common law is
intact there. 0 These factors point at least to the protection of
third parties, if not to the equivalent of a prudent-man standard
protecting fiduciaries."8'
From the standpoint of facilitated compromises and the
security of transactions, it may be regrettable that neither the
uniform act nor the New York act contains something equivalent
to Section 61 of the English Trustee Act, 1925,182 which provides:
If it appears to the court that a trustee ... is or may be person-
ally liable for any breach of trust . . . but has acted honestly
and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the breach
of trust and for omitting to obtain the directions of the court
in the matter in which he committed such breach, then the court
trustee possessed and properly exercised the powers he purports to exer-
cise. A third person is not bound to assure the proper application of
trust assets paid or delivered to the trustee.
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act § 7, supra note 175, at 27,1.
177. A trustee has power...
(19) to pay or contest any claim; to settle a claim by or against the
trust by compromise, arbitration, or otherwise; and to release in whole or
in part, any claim belonging to the trust to the extent that the claim
is uncollectible.
Uniform Trustees' Powers Act § 3(c) (19), supra note 175, at 269.
178. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law. § 127(2) (q) (Supp. 1965).
179. In the absence of contrary or limiting provisions in the order or
decree appointing a fiduciary or the will, deed or other instrument, or
a subsequent court order or decree, every fiduciary is authorized ...
(q) to compromise, contest or otherwise settle any and all claims In
favor of the estate, trust or fiduciary or in favor of third persons and
against the estate, trust or fiduciary.
Ibid.
180. See notes 145-51 supra.
181. But see Hendrickson, The New Fiducuaries' Powers Act, 37 N.Y. St.
B.J. 338, 341-42 (1965), where it is suggested that express powers clauses in New
York instruments will henceforth be strictly construed.
182. 16 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 19.
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may relieve him either wholly or partly from personal liability
for the same.
Professor Fratcher brought that provision to the attention of the
Uniform Commissioners, but the final draft of the uniform act
did not contain it.""3
The reasoning by which the New York act might be held to
require the extension of the Edelstein principle would seem to
obtain in those states which adopted the old Uniform Trust Ad-
ministration Act, or some sort of broad powers statute equivalent
to it."" In those states, to be sure, the extension will require
equating express statutory power-which is broad-with express
power in the instrument. Edelstein only equates express power in
the instrument with prior judicial approval. But the equation in
the first case is no greater than the equation in the second case,
and will be made if at all in states which have already held that
the common-law power to compromise claims is intact."s
If the radical conjecture that would extend Edelstein in New
York and in states with the uniform act is plausible, it should be
a small matter to add to it the incorporation-by-reference statutes
in Tennessee, North Carolina, and Arkansas. There a simple
adoption of Edelstein would accomplish the extension, since the
purpose of the incorporation-by-reference statutes is simply to
save the draftsman time." 6 When powers under the statutes are
incorporated, they are, for all purposes, express powers in the
instrument.
The conclusion that all these varieties of modern statutes
will be construed to extend the Edelstein principle to all fiduci-
aries covered by the statutes is logically compelling. If they are
not construed that way, two untoward results-results that are
not consistent with the aspirations of these new statutes-will
follow:
First, in states that have had judicial-approval statutes cov-
ering the same fiduciaries, the fiduciary will have less protection
than he used to have (where the old statutes are repealed), or
will have no more power with the same opportunity for prior ap-
proval (where the old statutes are not repealed). In other words-
as to powers to compromise claims-the statutes will either re-
duce fiduciary protection or accomplish nothing at all.
Second, in states where the new statutes cover one kind of
183. Professor Fratcher discussed his efforts during the summer workshop
for trust teachers at the New York University School of Law, August 1965.
184. See notes 122-23 supra.
185. See note 154 supra.
486. See Trautman, Decedents' Estates, Trusts and Future Interests, 17 Vand.
L. Rev. 1027, 1031 (1964).
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fiduciaries (trustees, for instance), and older statutes cover others
(personal representatives, for instance), fiduciaries under the new
statutes will have less protection than fiduciaries under the old.
Yet, as untoward as these results may seem to be, they may
be preferable to immunizing fiduciaries from any prudential re-
view of their compromise of claims-and by that I mean, in plain
language, any say-so from the real "owners" of the trust, the
beneficiaries. That result, given the present state of allowable ad-
ministrative discretion in fiduciaries, is likely to follow if the
Edelstein principle is extended to powers to compromise in the
modern powers statutes. The possibility of some happier resolu-
tion is the subject of what follows.
III
POWERS To COMPROMISE CLAIMs AND THE
OWNERS OF THE TRUST PROPERTY
In a way, the fiduciary's power to compromise claims can be
stretched onto a descending scale of fiduciary discretion, ranging
from the common law of Blue v. Marshall to the broadest prob-
able construction of Section 3(c) (19) of the Uniform Trustees'
Powers Act. At any point, though, it is fair to say that the fidu-
ciary has a significant amount of discretion. (This is true even in
those states where prior judicial approval is required but may be
given nunc pro tunc.) The remaining question is the extent to
which this discretion may be controlled-by judges, by bene-
ficiaries, and by beneficiaries who resort to judges.
Any discussion of the allowable discretion of fiduciaries
should make a preliminary distinction between dispositive discre-
tion and administrative discretion. When the discussion centers
on dispositive discretion, there is no doubt that courts review the
use of fiduciary judgments, and that they do it, of course, at the
behest of beneficiaries. This is a necessary corollary of the adop-
tion of the Claflin rule.""7 Trusts on this side of the Atlantic are
not subject to termination at the behest of adult beneficiaries;
they may not be terminated as long as a "material purpose" of
the trust remains to be accomplished.lSS Beneficiaries have there-
fore lost the most potent leverage they have over the conduct of
the trustee-the threat to terminate the trust. Trusts in this coun-
try are in a much more immediate sense subject to the dead hand
of the settlor. (It is, usually, dead.)"8 9
187. See Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19,20 N.E. 454 (1889).
188. 3 Scott, Trusts § 337, at 2446-47 (2d ed. 1956).
189. See Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 Yale LJ. 547 (1964).
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But the fact remains-and I take it that it is enough more
than a theory to be called a fact-that the property in the trust
"belongs" to the beneficiaries; it is their property.'"0 This has
been elementary to the trust for five centuries, and, indeed, the
whole concept depends upon its being elementary. Therefore the
trustee cannot deal with the property as if it were his own. The
beneficiaries must have some voice in what is done with it. The
rubric protecting beneficiaries in this country is abuse-of-discre-
tion and the forum in which the rubric has been invoked is equity.
Judges, that is, have a right to overrule fiduciary discretion when
it is abused.
This is, according to the Restatement of Trusts and Pro-
fessor Scott, an imposition upon the trustee of a duty to act "in
that state of mind in which it was contemplated by the settlor that
he should act." ' The formula has been invoked often enough in
courts of last resort that it can now be considered more than
simply a scholarly conclusion.' s2 It is one of Professor Scott's
monumental contributions to the law of trusts. And it obtains
whether the instrument vests discretion in limited terms or in
absolute terms. Professor Halbach's study of judicial control of
fiduciary discretion demonstrates that the fiduciary is almost al-
ways limited-regardless of what the instrument says." 3
But an investigation of the cases in which this formula has
been invoked, and in which fiduciaries have been forced to act
against their own discretionary decisions, discloses that they are
dispositive discretion cases. They involve things like invasion of
principal and discretionary allocation of income. They do not
involve decisions on investment, or decisions on sales or mortgages
of trust property, or decisions on whether or not to compromise
claims. The state-of-mind principle, in other words, tends to be
ignored or only invoked theoretically when the discussion is one
involving administrative discretion; it is irrelevant in a discussion
of fiduciary discretion in compromising claims, which is dearly a
matter, not of dispositive but of administrative discretion. Neither
the state-of-mind rubric nor Professor Halbach's somewhat
broader formulation has been given any bearing in these cases.
Decisions from three significant jurisdictions-New York, Cali-
fornia, and Pennsylvania-illustrate the distinction.
190. Cf. the distinction between "ownership" and "title" in Restatement
(Second), Trusts § 2, comment d (1959).
191. 2 Scott, Trusts § 187, at 1375-76 (2d ed. 1956).
192. Id. § 187 n.2.
193. See Halbach, Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 Colum.
L. Rev. 1425 (1961).
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A. New York
Helen D. Geffen left her entire estate in trust for her daugh-
ter, Melinda. Melinda was life beneficiary and remainderman; no
one else had any possibility of sharing in Helen's estate, except
through Melinda. The executor of Helen's estate, a bank, entered
into litigation with Melinda's father over an income-tax contribu-
tion claim which, the executor said, might have involved the re-
covery for the estate of as much as $521,800. Melinda's father
offered to settle this litigation for $12,500, but the executor re-
fused. Melinda then brought a petition in surrogate's court to
compel the compromise; the executor moved to dismiss, which
motion the surrogate granted in Matter of Estate of Geffen.0 4
The reason Melinda petitioned, the surrogate noted, was non-
economic; it arose from the "normal and affectionate relation-
ship" she had with her father. The litigation between him and the
estate had "placed a strain upon this relationship" and Melinda
concluded that the family advantages of accepting her father's
offer of compromise were greater than the purely economic ad-
vantages, if any, of continuing it. Not only that, but Melinda of-
fered to release the executor from any liability it might incur for
accepting the compromise.
The surrogate obviously sympathized with Melinda, but
found, on good authority, that his power to control the conduct of
fiduciaries "does not permit the Surrogate to substitute his judg-
ment and discretion for that of the fiduciary." It was, he said, a
"well established rule" in New York that "the court may not
interfere with the exercise of judgment and discretion on the part
of a fiduciary."'19 5
The surrogate made it clear, however, that he dismissed the
petition only because of the certain fate of his ruling on appeal.
"This decision is based upon the lack of authority to grant such
relief and is not to be construed as in any way approving of the
action of the executor." He added that his ruling was "without
prejudice to the right of the beneficiary to hold the fiduciary ac-
countable for its acts and transactions and to object to any loss or
expense that might result to this estate by reason of the litiga-
tion."' 6 He finished his written opinion with a lecture to the
executor on its duty to ignore the possibility of greater fees for
itself in continuing the litigation.
The surrogate in Geffen read the New York authorities on
the matter well. The first indication that the fiduciary's discretion
194. 25 Misc. 2d 734, 202 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Surr. Ct. 1960).
195. Id. at 736, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 601-02.
196. Id. at 737, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
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in compromising claims was not subject to judicial interference
appears in an 1828 opinion of what was then the New York Court
of Errors.197 The rule was clearly stated in an 1845 chancery
opinion, which emphasized that "the only proper course... is to
leave it to the executor, under his oath of office faithfully and
honestly to discharge the duties of executor."1 8 The chancellor,
like the surrogate in Geffen, then lectured the fiduciary before him
on his duties, noting that unwise compromises and unwise refusals
to compromise would be open on accounting. He said, without
citation of authority, that his decision was consistent with the
decisions of "the ecclesiastical courts in England." 1"
In 1866, the court of appeals refused to allow the statute on
removal of trustees to be used to force an executor to exercise
his discretion. 0 ° More direct authority in. 1929 denied to a sur-
rogate the jurisdiction to force a fiduciary to submit a proposed
compromise for prior judicial approval. The prior-approval stat-
ute, the court there said, "creates a privilege for executors and
trustees, not an obligation upon them.... The surrogate has no
authority upon the petition of a claimant to compel executors to
petition for the consummation of a settlement which they dis-
approve."
201
The court of appeals extended the principle to cases, where
co-fiduciaries disapproved of compromises in 1932, -212 and a sur-
rogate applied it where beneficiaries objected to a compromise
three years later; 2 1 in both cases the court refused to prevent a
compromise. The latter opinion noted that the surrogate "is wont
on occasion to adopt a somewhat paternalistic attitude toward the
administration of estates ....
The issue was central to a 1942 case in the appellate division,
in which an administrator refused to take a deed in lieu of fore-
closure, over the protestations of one of the estate beneficiaries.2-°
197. Murray v. Blatchford, 1 Wend. 583 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1828).
198. Matter of Parker, 1 Barb. Ch. 154, 166 (N.Y. 1845).
199. Id. at ISS.
200. Wood v. Brown, 34 N.Y. 337 (1866). Cf. In re Scott, 1 Red. 234 (N.Y.
Surr. CL 1877). Accord, May v. Sansberry, 119 Ind. App. 523, 86 N.E.2d 88 (1949).
201. Matter of Estate of Corbin, 227 App. Div. 87, 90, 236 N.Y. Supp. 653,
656 (lst Dep't 1929).
202. Matter of Estate of Leopold, 259 N.Y. 274, 181 N.E. 570 (1932). See
In re Slifka's Will, 205 N.Y.S.2d 395 (Surr. Ct. 1960).
203. Matter of Estate of Lester, 155 Misc. 536, 280 N.Y. Supp. 341 (Surr.
Ct. 1935).
204. Id. at 537, 280 N.Y. Supp. at 343. See Matter of Estate of Van Valken-
burgh, 164 Misc. 295, 298 N.Y. Supp. 819 (Surr. CL 1937), one of a s.ries of
cases in which New York surrogates refuse to give fiduciaries "business advice."
See also Brown v. Brown, 72 N.J. Eq. 667, 65 At. 739 (Ch. 1907) (adopting a
similar position).
205. Matter of Tompkins, 264 App. Div. 612, 3S N.Y.S.2d 880 (2d Dep't
1942).
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In that opinion, which formed the principal basis of the surro-
gate's judgment in Geffen, the court pointed to the nineteenth
century New York discussion of the question, and concluded that
the surrogate was "without power to enjoin the administrator...
and to direct him to dispose of the controversy .... " The statu-
tory power of surrogates "does not extend to control of... fi-
duciaries in the orderly discharge of their duties to the extent of
compelling them to prosecute or defend actions ... 2,o0 One
member of that court dissented, and another concurred specially
with a warning to the fiduciary of his exposure to surcharge on
accounting.20 7 It appears, therefore, that a surrogate's only power
over compromises is consequent to petitions by the fiduciaries, and
it stops at mere consideration, in that proceeding, of whatever
objections are raised by beneficiaries2 08 The beneficiary's only
other recourse in New York is a petition for surcharge which will,
typically, arise long after the compromise is concluded, or the op-
portunity to compromise lost, and in which his only relief is eco-
nomic-the sort of relief that Melinda Geffen was willing to sur-
render in favor of family harmony.
B. California
The California authorities focus in a 1965 opinion of the
appellate court, which held probate courts in that state without
jurisdiction to impose a compromise at the behest of an estate
creditor. 09 "The case law holds that the power is restricted to
the administrator or executor," the court said, 10 with good sup-
port from a line of cases reaching back to a 1934 decision of the
California Supreme Court.211 These authorities hold that the stat-
ute in California restricts probate court power to approval of
compromises at the petition of the fiduciary. The rule is to some
extent bound up with a judge-made restriction on the probate
court's power to enforce agreements of settlement-a problem
somewhat tangential to the court's power to compel settlement 12
-but it extends to the exaltation of fiduciary discretion where
206. Id. at 613, 35 N.Y.S.2d at 881. See Matter of Estate of Amo, 264 App.
Div. 516, 35 N.Y.S.2d 808 (4th Dep't 1942); In re Stella's Estate, 81 N.Y.S.2d 579
(Surr. Ct. 1948).
207. 264 App. Div. at 614, 35 N.Y.S.2d at 882.
208. See In re Patenotre's Estate, 138 N.Y.S.2d 899, 904 (Surr. Ct. 1955).
209. In re Estate of Majtan, 46 Cal. Rptr. 561 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
210. Id. at 570.
211. McPike v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 254, 30 P.2d,17 (1934).
212. See Estate of Boyd, 212 Cal. App. 2d 634, 28 Cal. Rptr. 258 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963).
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beneficiaries object to settlement,213 and in a number of other
situations. 14
C. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania authority centers in two recent decisions, one
from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, one from a trial judge.
Neither presents as aggravated a factual situation as one finds in
Geffen and in some of the California cases, and the indication in
the Pennsylvania opinions is that facts like those in Geffen are
open to contrary decision in that state. The supreme court case,
Bailey Estate,"'5 was a petition in the alternative-either to re-
move the administratrix or to force her to settle a claim. The ad-
ministratrix was a one-fifth estate beneficiary; the compromise
offer was $14,000, on a doubtful and doubtfully collectible debt
of $300,000 owed* the estate. The court affirmed, per curiam, on
the trial court's opinion, 2" an orphans' court decree removing the
administratrix. The orphans' court judge thought removal was
indicated and said he did not have to reach the question of com-
promise approval. He did, however, comment that a petition for
approval of compromise was "premature" because brought by
four-fifths of the distributees, and not by the administratrix.
On the removal point, the trial judge in Bailey said the ad-
ministratrix was shown to be incapable of an independent judg-
ment on the offer of compromise. It is not entirely clear why the
compromise was so advantageous to the estate that a denial of it
indicated clouded judgment, but the judge said he was "satisfied
that she cannot exercise the objective judgment required of
her .... . 21 The decision is therefore explainable as holding that
no fiduciary judgment was exercised, rather than that judicial
discretion had to be substituted for fiduciary discretion.
The later Pennsylvania decision, Trumbauer Estatei"' arose
out of a business-purchase contract between the decedent and his
grandson. The decedent's will provided that, if the grandson was
unable to pay the balance due under the contract, the executor
should grant him an interest-free purchase money mortgage. The
213. Estate of Wilson, 116 Cal. App. 2d 523, 253 P.2d 1011 (Dist. Ct. App.
1953) ; Estate of Newmark, 67 Cal. App. 2d 369, 154 P.2d 20 (Dist. CL. App. 1944).
214. Estate of Green, 145 Cal. App. 2d 25, 301 P.2d 889 (Dist. CL. App.
1956); Estate of Vedder, 121 Cal. App. 2d 402, 263 P.2d 59 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
See also Bryne v. Harvey, 211 Cal. App. 2d 92, 27 Cal. Rptr. 110 (Dist. CL App.
1962); Estate of Coffey, 161 Cal. App. 2d 259, 326 P.2d 511 (Dist. CL App. 195S) ;
In re Lucas' Estate, 137 P.2d 709 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), afi'd, 23 Cal. 2d 454. 144
P.2d 340 (1943).
215. 409 Pa. 222, 186 A.2d 1 (1962).
216. Reported at 186 A.2d 2-4.
217. Id. at 3.
218. 33 Pa. D. & C.2d 335 (Orphans' Ct. 1964).
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grandson claimed the mortgage was appropriate; the executor
contended the grandson was able to pay the balance due and that
the will clause was therefore not applicable. The distributees of
the estate, who were before the court, were divided on the issue.
The grandson petitioned for a decree compelling the compromise,
under Section 51 3 of the Fiduciaries Act,219 which permits such a
petition by "any party in interest." Despite the standing provi-
sion, however, the trial judge -held that the statute did not permit
judicial interference with fiduciary discretion. The fiduciary must
either join in the petition for approval or consent to it, the court
said. "It was never intended that the privileges provided by this
section should inure to any third party either directly or indirectly,
but they are solely for the protection of the fiduciary.1220
In any event, the court said, a judicial decree authorizing the
compromise would be only permissive; the fiduciary would not be
bound to follow it. From Bailey, the court took warrant for a
stern warning to the executor; he may not be subject to compul-
sory settlement, but he is subject to removal if he acts improperly.
"If a personal representative refuses to enter into a compromise
and such refusal appears to be arbitrary, unreasonable and clearly
contrary to the best interests of the estate, such circumstances in
themselves may be sufficient ground for the fiduciary's removal."2 '
The Pennsylvania cases are not so rigorous as are the New
York and California cases. Bailey leaves open the possibility of
removal as an alternative to compulsory settlement-a potent
lever which both New York s2 2 and Indiana 23 authorities seem to
have foreclosed. Trumbauer can be explained on the ground that
not all of the beneficiaries agreed on the proposed settlement, and
on the further ground that the decedent arguably delegated to the
executor a special discretion in deciding when the alternative
means of payment should be invoked.
The general tenor of American case authority-what there is
of it-seems to be consistent with these three lines of cases. A
couple of cases seem directly in point; 224 most of the others found
only imply or state in dicta that judges must not interfere with
fiduciary discretion in compromising claims,225 and there is a cer-
219. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 20, § 320.513 (1964).
220. 33 Pa. D. & C.2d at 341.
221. Id. at 343-44. See also Prusak Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C.2d 329 (Orphans'
Ct. 1963); Crawford's Estate, 20 Pa. D. & C. 186 (Orphans' Ct. 1933), aff'd, 321
Pa. 131,184 AtI. 1 (1936) (vacating approval of compromise).
222. Wood v. Brown, 34 N.Y. 337 (1866).
223. May v. Sansberry, 119 Ind. App. 523, 86 N.E.2d 88 (1949).
224. Bankers Trust Co. v. Hess, 2 NJ. Super. 308, 314, 63 A.2d 712 (Ch.
1949) (power to compromise given in will); Bingham v. Walker Bros., 75 Utah
149, 283 Pac. 1055 (1929).
225. Oles v. Furlong, 134 Conn. 334, 343, 57 A.2d 405, 409 (1948); Slusher
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tain amount of authority that tends-but only tends-to an op-
posite conclusion,122 some of it in the same jurisdictions.2 7 Some
of the authority that seems to support a relatively rigorous posi-
tion against judicial interference can be explained as in part pro-
tection of broad express powers; 228 and some of the authority tend-
ing in the other direction may be no more than a rigid insistence on
the rights of the beneficiaries to raise questions of proper compro-
mise in the fiduciary's accounting.2
A pair of cases from Minnesota indicate that a position in
favor of beneficiaries may be taken in that state. The most con-
spicuous is the Mayo trust case," 0 in which the court permitted
deviation from express restrictions on investment, at the suit of
the beneficiaries, which suit was resisted by the trustees. That
case is not a compromise-of-claims case, but it is arguably an ad-
ministrative-discretion case. The other Minnesota case, In re
Estate of Parcker,-31 is quite complex on its facts and seems
finally to decide only a small point of pleading. A settlement
made by the sole heir of an estate was upheld, but possibly only
because objection to the settlement had been waived in the trial
court. For whatever force it has, the headnote writer thought
the case stood for the proposition that an administratrLx could
not object to a settlement that had been ratified by the sole
heir;" 2 if that were true-and it exaggerates the holding to say




Whatever the faint judicial murmuring to the contrary, most
of the case law points unmistakably to the conclusion that courts
v. Weller, 151 Ky. 203, 151 S.W. 684 (1912); May v. Sansberry, 119 Ind. App.
523, 86 N.E.2d 88 (1949); Brewer v. King, 212 Iowa 665, 237 N.W. 503 (1931).
226. McCullum v. Gavin, 206 Miss. 151, 39 So. 2d 859 (1949). A line of
Massachusetts cases is fairly promising. Price v. Price, 204 N.E.2d 902 (BLasS.),
cert. denied, 382 US. 820 (1965); Steward v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation,
200 N.E.2d 460 (Mass. 1964); Price v. Price, 341 Mass. 390, 170 N.E.2d 346 (1960).
227. Griffin v. Sturges, 131 Conn. 471, 482, 40 A.2d 758, 762 (1944); Bourne's
Ex'r v. Edwards, 223 Ky. 35, 2 S.W.2d 1053 (1928) (heirs' compromise enforced
over objection of executor); In re Estate of Fleming, 228 Iowa 665, 293 N.W. 511
(1940).
228. See Dumaine v. Dumaine, 301 Mass. 214, 16 N.E.2d 625 (193S).
229. In re Hutton's Estate, 92 Mo. App. 132 (1901); Protective Check Writer
Co. v. Collins, 92 N.H. 27, 32, 23 A.2d 770, 774 (1942).
230. In re Trusteeship Under Agreement With Mayo, 259 Blin. 91, 10S
N.W.2d 900 (1960).
231. 178 Minn. 409, 227 N.W. 426 (1929).
232. "A settlement in the probate court of certain claims having been ratified
by the sole heir, the administratrix of the estate may not question the authority
of the attorney who acted for the heir in making the settlement." Ibid.
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will not interfere with fiduciaries who refuse to settle claims, or
refuse to desist from settlements, at the behest of beneficiaries.
The only certain remedy for bad settlements, or bad refusals
to settle, is the accounting, which always comes too late to save
anything but economic loss-and often too late for that. Aside
from accounting, the judiciary has come up with nothing better
than an occasional lecture.
The state of case law on administrative discretion raises a
difficult dilemma for the new fiduciary powers statutes. On the
one hand, logic and good sense (never precisely the same) indi-
cate that the new statutes should be construed as the express
power in Edelstein was construed. Fiduciaries who make good-
faith compromises under the new statutes should not be sur-
chargeable. In addition, third parties who make agreements with
the fiduciaries should be assured of valid transactions.
On the other hand, judges refuse to let beneficiaries interfere
with fiduciary compromises-even in cases where all equitable
ownership is in the interfering beneficiary, an extreme that Geffen
illustrates with painful clarity. This has been done by 'courts
with the tacit or express assumption that stubborn insistence on
compromise, or stubborn refusal to compromise, would be open on
accounting." 3 But, if Edelstein is extended to statutory powers, as
it should be, the assumption disappears. The result, unless Geffen
and its kin are reconsidered, will be an airtight, unreviewable
233. A parallel can be found in cases involving settlements of personal injury
claims by liability insurers. It occasionally happens that the insurer refuses to
settle for an amount at or below the limits of the liability policy, with the result
that the case goes to trial and judgment for an amount in excess of policy limits,
which excess is a judgment against the insured. The insured may then have a
cause of action against the insurer for its failure to settle the claim in such a way
as to avoid the excess judgment. The courts seem to be divided on what the insured
must show to sustain such a cause of action. Some courts have held that negligence
in failure to settle is enough. Anderson v. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 340 F.2d
406, 408 (7th Cir. 1965):
1Tlhe liability issue was weak, the injuries were substantial and the de-
mands made in the face of such extreme exposure were reasonable. These
facts were sufficient to justify a jury in finding as this jury did that the
liability insurer in handling the claim was negligently unreasonable in
obdurately failing to negotiate a settlement and that its conduct created an
undue risk to its insured.
The court there found for the insured, applying Indiana law. A year before it had
held for the insurer, applying Illinois law. Both states, in the opinion of the federal
court, key recovery to negligence. General Cas. Co. v. Whipple, 328 F.2d 353 (7th
Cir. 1964). It is clear from these opinions, and earlier authority discussed in them,
that the insurer is under a sort of fiduciary obligation to act for the best interests
of the insured. If that analogy is not too far-fetched, it indicates a duty to
compromise in a proper case, comparable to the duty that might be asserted on a
trustee's accounting, as a ground for surcharge. Quaere: Would an action in equity
lie to compel settlement when the underlying personal injury action is pending?
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control of compromises by the fiduciary. As the surrogate in
Geffen indicated, that is undesirable.
The alternative, if the Edelstein principle is not held back, is
to permit beneficiaries to compel or forbid compromise-that is,
to force the fiduciary to defend his judgment on the matter, at
the time it arises, before a judge, and to leave final decision in
the judge. This probably does not require that Geffen and the
Pennsylvania and California cases be overruled. The new powers
statutes so radically change the climate of powers to compromise
that the precedents are simply no longer applicable.
One critical conclusion cannot be avoided, despite one's ad-
miration for a noble legislative effort: The conclusion of the New
York Commission on Estates, that section 127(2)(q) merely
codified existing law, 4 underestimates the effect of the Commis-
sion's work. That section and its counterparts outside New
York promise someday to ask again an old and new question:
Whose property is in the trust?
234. N.Y. Temporary Comm'n on Estates, Third Report 18-19 (1964).
235. See Hendrickson, The New Fiduciaries' Powers Act, 37 N.Y. St. BJ. 338
(1965); Horowitz, Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, 41 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1966).
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